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ExtraVehicular Activity Lessons Learned
from Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Missions
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HST Project Office,  NASA Goddard Space Flight Center,  Greenbelt, MD,  20771
(301) 286-4338;   rwerneth@hst.nasa.gov
Abstract.  NASA’s Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was designed for regular servicing by Space Shuttle astronauts
performing extravehicular activities (EVAs), or spacewalks, to maintain, repair, and upgrade the telescope.  Through
three successful servicing missions to date, EVA processes have been developed by applying a series of important
lessons learned.  These lessons learned are also applicable to many other future human spaceflight and robotic
missions, such as International Space Station, satellite retrieval and servicing, and long-duration spaceflight.  HST has
become NASA’s pathfinder for observatories, EVA development, and EVA mission execution.
HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE SERVICING
NASA’s Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was deployed from the Space Shuttle in April 1990.  It was designed for
periodic servicing visits through ExtraVehicular Activities (EVAs), spacewalks by Shuttle astronaut crews, to
support its systems.  This support is planned in three areas:  maintenance, repair, and enhancement.  The servicing
crews remove and replace electronic components and scientific instruments after normal degradations, after failures,
or incorporate state-of-the-art advancements in technology.  Since its launch, there have been three very successful
EVA-intensive servicing missions:  STS-61 in December 1993, STS-82 in February 1997, and STS-103 in
December 1999.  All three missions returned the telescope back into orbit to continue its task of collecting superb
scientific data.  Each new scientific instrument installed by the EVA astronauts has increased Hubble’s scientific
power by an order of magnitude (Goddard, 2000).  The next servicing mission is planned for late 2001 and is
designated STS-109.  The telescope originally had a planned life of 15 years, but servicing by EVA has already
extended the expected life of the observatory to 20 years.
In each of the three servicing missions, the tasks performed by the EVA crewmembers have ranged from the
change-out of small data recorders to large telephone booth-sized scientific instruments, and from simple electrical
harness connections to complex solar array panel change-outs.  They have ranged from nominal, well-practiced
upgrades of a computer to the unplanned contingency IntraVehicular Activity (IVA) fabrication and EVA
installation of thermal insulation blankets.  The three missions have included more than 93 hours of EVA over 13
days installing 45 items on the telescope, making it a pathfinder for NASA observatories, as well as for EVA
development, training, verification, and mission timeline execution.
The key to the servicing of Hubble is the original risk-management philosophy of designing for “EVA friendliness”
– the pre-planned capability to easily remove and replace many components through astronaut team servicing.  The
designers of the telescope planned ahead and provided for subsystems known as Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs)
and Orbital Replacement Instruments (ORIs) with standardized and EVA-compatible interfaces (Marshall, 1987).  In
addition, the telescope itself was designed with built-in astronaut crew aids, such as handrails and tether points for
translation paths, sockets for attaching portable foot restraint platforms to provide secure worksites, standardized
access doors, electrical connector maps, and instruction labels.
HST is an 11-ton Cassegrainian telescope with a 2.4-meter diameter primary mirror.  The telescope is nominally 4.2
meters in diameter by 15.9 meters high, with two 12-meter solar array panels (Lockheed, 1993).  It is in Low Earth
Orbit at an altitude of approximately 500 kilometers, always looking into outer space.  For servicing, it is grappled
by the Shuttle’s Remote Manipulator System (RMS) and then placed on and latched to a special carrier platform in
the Shuttle Payload Bay.  This platform allows HST to be rotated and/or pivoted to a proper servicing orientation.
Servicing is accomplished by two alternating teams of two EVA astronauts each, with each EVA day planned for 6-
1/2 hours.  Figure 1 shows an on-orbit photograph of the telescope as it is about to be released back into orbit from
the Shuttle after a successful servicing mission.
FIGURE 1.  The Hubble Space Telescope is returned to orbit after a successful servicing mission.
The primary reason for the successes of the three HST servicing mission EVAs has been the application of a proven
process that serves as a model for the two remaining Hubble missions planned for 2001 and 2003 – as well as for
International Space Station (ISS) missions for assembly, logistics, and maintenance.  The ISS Program plans to
conduct more than 160 EVAs by 2006 (Golightly, 2000).  In comparison, the sixth spacewalk for ISS, conducted on
STS-106 in September 2000, was the 50th EVA in Shuttle Program history.  The HST methodology also applies to
future large space structure deployments, satellite refueling (Sullivan, 2000) and servicing, satellite retrieval,
ExtraVehicular Robotics (EVR) missions, and long-duration spaceflights such as missions to a libration point, the
moon, or Mars.  EVR includes robotics, telerobotics and astronaut-robot “partnerships”.
Ten primary lessons learned have been collected as the basis for the successful HST EVA development process.
The first, and arguably the most important, is…
…build a team of experts.
The extensive teamwork throughout formal and informal operations is the prime reason for the success of Hubble
servicing missions.  HST instruments and hardware come together from manufacturers all over the United States and
Europe.  They are integrated and tested at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in Greenbelt, Maryland in a
class 10,000 laminar flow clean room, the largest of its type in the world.  It is there that the astronaut crewmembers
get their familiarization and training with the Hubble flight hardware.  In addition, the crew is trained by a team of
Johnson Space Center (JSC) and Goddard engineers at the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory (NBL) in Houston, Texas.
The NBL facility is a 12-meter deep pool containing 24 million liters of water for simulated zero-gravity testing and
training.  Testing and training with the combined team continues at Kennedy Space Center for final integration and
Shuttle launch.  The on-orbit servicing mission is controlled from JSC by the joint team.  In preparing for each
servicing mission, the team members communicate and make decisions through Integrated Project Teams.
The extravehicular activity portion of the HST Project team is organized by designating an expert with "ownership"
for each planned change-out who interfaces with the corresponding Project hardware design engineers.  In order to
provide for proper plans and designs for EVA enhancements and procedures, the EVA expert must become involved
very early in the design process.  This is analogous to the basic requirement for robotic interfaces when designing
hardware for robotic applications.  The EVA expert is an important team member because the requirements and
standards for EVA operations are often unique.  The EVA engineer must consider the HST subsystem along with the
astronaut in a pressurized space suit which is actually a spacecraft itself.  One specialized EVA engineer is the
astronaut tool designer who must design, test, integrate, and provide training for the use of unique, special-purpose
space tools.
In order to provide continuity, the Astronaut Office at JSC has established a significant transition between servicing
missions.  An EVA astronaut from a previous servicing mission has carried over as an HST EVA expert liaison until
the next servicing mission crew has been named.  This crewmember then became the Payload Commander for the
next mission.  In addition, IVA crewmembers have also been assigned to follow-on HST servicing missions in order
to provide continuity from in-cabin HST mission experts.
A significant part of our lessons learned with respect to teamwork is the importance of "building" our own experts
working in the astronaut suit.  Because the EVA human factors aspects of Hubble servicing mission designs and
operations are so unique, the EVA team has received substantial benefits from getting Project design engineers
trained as suited subjects for the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory testing.  This means that the designers can apply their
own experiences for moving with and operating tools and performing change-outs of ORUs and ORIs.  Their
understanding of mobility, visibility, and pressurized suit and glove operations has been able to be applied daily
throughout the design process.  This resulted in a more efficient process with quicker, better tool and hardware
designs.
As the EVA team members begin this development process, it is essential that they…
…start by establishing requirements.
With the original objective – and challenge – of making Hubble serviceable by Shuttle astronauts, it has always been
critical to plan ahead to include requirements for features that would permit future EVA servicing.  Likewise, the
HST servicing mission EVA tool and hardware design process always starts with the establishment of requirements
(Sheffield, 1992).  The basis for all follow-on testing, evaluation, training, and verification activities for HST
servicing is this set of requirements.  These requirements are formulated by the experts at each level of management,
flowing down from the highest level:
• Overall mission • EVA change-out support hardware
• Mission change-out hardware • EVA tools to accomplish change-outs
• EVA portion of the mission
EVA procedures and hardware designs start with the rationale for each requirement and allow the flexibility to add
derived requirements.  They often include classic brainstorming sessions to provide and evaluate alternate concepts
for the design.   The basic design philosophy is to design for success, but to always prepare for contingencies.
Therefore, the design alternatives address anticipated contingency features or future requirements.  An example of
this is a lubricant applicator that was designed to preclude problems with the latches securing HST instrument bay
doors.  Another example is a power tool that is currently being designed to aid in removing electrical connectors that
will replace manual connector tools in order to reduce fatigue and to save valuable EVA time.
Regular briefings after HST EVA tests, including those with the astronaut crew, are often brainstorming sessions.
The EVA design engineers, the astronauts, and other Project engineers discuss requirements and solutions to
problems that have occurred during the tests.  An example of classic brainstorming occurred during the first HST
servicing mission.  When the EVA astronauts unexpectedly discovered a loose cover on a magnetometer on HST, a
real-time decision had to be made on how to fix the problem.  The mission support ground crew personnel at JSC
and GSFC formed a team to assess the problem, set requirements, and arrive at a solution.  The team considered all
possible hardware resources that were available and two alternatives were considered:  cutting off either a flat sheet
of insulation or a contoured cover from an instrument carrier in the Shuttle’s payload bay.  The first option would
require the forming of a cover to fit the magnetometer.  After consulting with the contamination expert and
conducting fit-checks on mock-up hardware, the contoured cover option was selected.  Complete procedures and
drawings were sent to the Shuttle crew and the magnetometer cover fabrication (by IVA) and repair (by EVA) were
successfully carried out.  A result of this problem and its solution was to establish a new requirement for subsequent
missions to manifest a contingency insulation repair kit.  This kit contains insulation sheets, wires, and fittings.  It
was used on the second servicing mission to fabricate insulation patches when unexpected tears were found on
several pieces of the telescope’s exterior insulation.
With firm requirements established, the HST EVA team’s basic design objective is then to…
…keep the designs simple.
A key consideration in designing for HST that is different from most other engineering design considerations is that
one side of the interface is not physically available; it is on the telescope in orbit.   Because of this, and because a
major HST objective is to save valuable EVA time, the hierarchy of design goals and considerations for EVA tools
and interfaces to meet the initial and derived requirements is:
• Wherever possible, don't require a tool interface; use the gloved hand.
• If a tool is determined to be required, use an existing standard tool or interface, such as a 7/16-inch hex
head bolt.
• If necessary, design a general-purpose manual or power tool.
• If necessary to meet the specific objective, design a unique tool.
• Consider if the task is to be performed by the crewmember on the Remote Manipulator System arm
platform or by the “free-floater”, the crewmember away from the arm who is tethered to the Shuttle.
• Consider if the task to be performed single-handedly.
The basic considerations for EVA design also apply to robotic system design:
• How would a person do the same or similar task in 1-g?
• What standard interfaces can be used?
• How do hardware or tool stowage, staging, transportation to the worksite, and tool interchangeability affect
the design?
For EVA applications, special considerations must also be given to safety of the astronauts, the payload, and the
Shuttle; tethering requirements; thermal conditions; pressurized EVA suit operations; astronaut capabilities,
limitations, and fatigue; and the saving of EVA time.
There are typically 150 types of tools manifested for a Hubble servicing mission.  Examples of EVA designs
developed by the Hubble Space Telescope EVA team include adjustable-length extensions, articulating crew aids for
use in translation or as platforms at work sites, tools to capture removed hardware, electrical harness retention
devices, unique manual tools for small low-torque coaxial cable connectors, and computer-controlled power tools to
save EVA time.  The computerized HST Pistol Grip Tool, which controls – and records – torques, speed, and turns,
is shown in Figure 2 being used on orbit.
The HST Project’s philosophy for design solutions is typified by the surprisingly simple solution to the aspherical
aberration of the primary mirror that was discovered soon after Hubble’s deployment in 1990.  The outer edge of the
mirror had been ground too flat during fabrication – by 2.2 microns – and this caused degradation of some of the
initial images.  The simple, but elegant, solution was to design a series of small, trainable corrective mirrors attached
to the replacement axial scientific instrument that was already being planned for installation during the first
scheduled servicing mission in 1993.
FIGURE 2.  The HST Pistol Grip Tool being used by astronaut Claude Nicollier on orbit during the third servicing mission.
In order to ensure the best design possible in the process of evolving into mature designs, the HST EVA
development team must then…
…get feedback from users.
An important Hubble Space Telescope lesson learned is the value of establishing a process that asks for, records,
evaluates, and then responds to feedback from users.  In our case, the “users” are the EVA astronauts that carry out
the Hubble servicing mission.  They are the experts who have experienced hands-on EVA operations on orbit.
The HST engineering development process – for flight hardware and for on-orbit procedures – is built around
iteration based on extensive feedback.  The process starts with the development of initial concepts in accordance
with the requirements established for each change-out.  The first evaluations from testing at NBL are made by the
Project engineers as surrogate EVA astronauts.  Their feedback allows improvements to the hardware and
procedures before the Johnson Space Center astronauts conduct their evaluations.
Then, crews of JSC astronauts who are potential candidates for HST servicing mission EVA positions evaluate the
hardware and procedures.  Their feedback leads to further design enhancements.  This process has proven to be
critical in the design of effective tools and operations for Hubble servicing.
The astronaut feedback has been effective because it is provided in four standardized rating categories:
ACCEPTABLE:  No design changes are required and the astronauts can accomplish the task with little or no
difficulty.
UNACCEPTABLE-1:  Minor design changes are required.  The task can be done, but with difficulty.  Only 1-g
testing for revalidation is required.
UNACCEPTABLE-2:  Major design modifications are required so that the task can be accomplished.  Re-testing
is required.
INCONCLUSIVE:  The hardware or task cannot be fully evaluated because of an improper test environment or
inadequate hardware fidelity.  Modification or redesign followed by re-testing is required.
In tests where multiple test subjects participate, an astronaut summary Crew Consensus Report is submitted to the
HST Project in order to document itemized test results, design recommendations, and overall ratings.  This
standardized feedback method leads to specific responses by the Project as to what modifications can be made.
Many Hubble tools, ranging from manual connector tools to computerized power wrenches, have evolved through
significant improvements based on this astronaut crew feedback process.
A primary example where major changes have been incorporated is the Cross Aft Shroud Tool (CAST) that was
designed to meet a requirement to pass a harness from one side of the interior of the telescope to the other.  Because
the tool was at the limit of the astronaut’s reach, it was suggested by the crewmembers that the tool be eliminated
and that additional stiffness be added to the harness in order to accomplish the pass-through task and to save EVA
time.  Based on this feedback, the tool evolved from a separate tool to an integrated tool-harness combination, and
then to a tool-less harness.
Asking the astronaut-users for feedback needs to be followed up with another question from the design team
members as they…
…continually ask “What if…?”
One of the key lessons learned that is applicable to hardware design – and ultimately to mission readiness –
recognizes the importance of constantly considering “What if this component does not operate properly?”
In parallel with the development of nominal procedures and hardware there are activities for contingency procedures
and documentation, fault-tolerant tools, and contingency training.  All hardware and procedures are required to be
single-fault tolerant to support the servicing mission.
Several levels of important questions that the HST EVA designers have learned to continually ask are:
• “What if this mechanism fails?”  (This leads to collecting and verifying engineering data for torque
requirements and mechanical failure modes.)
• “Is there a method of trouble shooting?”  (This leads to a documented procedure in the EVA Contingency
Document (Goddard, 1999) for the servicing mission.)
• “Can this component be overridden, removed, or jettisoned?”  (This leads to additional design features for
use in case an anomaly occurs.)
• “Are there back-up tools?”  (This leads to a logistics policy for manifesting spares and/or alternate tools in
accessible stowage locations in case they are needed in a contingency.)
Answering each of these questions leads to the incorporation of contingency planning, documentation (Goddard,
1993), and training to cover potential anomalies.
The ground and astronaut crews undergo extensive simulations to train for possible failures.  This practice helps in
developing and validating procedures and hardware.  During mission simulation sessions, anomalies are injected to
test the overall team readiness.  Typically, the most extensive contingency planning is for the loss of the Shuttle’s
Remote Manipulator System (RMS) arm.  This often requires the addition of new crew aids on the orbital
replacement hardware or on the HST carriers in the payload bay in order to accomplish a contingency change-out
without the RMS.
In some cases, special hardware training devices are built specifically to provide – and expand – training by
allowing practice for nominal and contingency procedures.  An example is the Aft Shroud Door Trainer, which is a
full-scale, high-fidelity mock-up of two large asymmetrical HST bay doors that were difficult to close on the first
servicing mission.
In supporting a servicing mission, the HST EVA team is actually divided into three teams in order to address
nominal and contingency situations:
• The EVA Orbit Team, on duty during the scheduled 6-hour on-orbit EVAs, responds to any real-time
anomalies.
• The EVA Replanning Team revises mission plans and projects the activities and timelines for any changes.
• The EVA Overlap Team spans the other two teams’ duty times in order to increase situational awareness,
improve communications, and provide continuity, especially when anomalies occur.
Each of these EVA teams and the astronaut crewmember team benefits because we…
…use a variety of training methods.
It is essential for Hubble servicing mission success that the astronaut crew is trained using various methods and
hardware trainers.  The challenges of preparing for a remote mission in space demand that these training methods
supplement each other.
The astronauts receive extensive training on the actual flight hardware or on high-fidelity, flight-like hardware at the
Goddard Space Flight Center.  The primary advantage of this training is that it involves flight change-out hardware
and carriers and flight tools interfacing with high-fidelity mock-ups built to flight drawings.  The disadvantages are
the presence of gravity, the mechanical limitations on cycling of flight mechanisms, and the absence of a pressurized
astronaut suit capability.
These disadvantages are mostly overcome by the extensive underwater training that is conducted at the Johnson
Space Center, where full-scale mock-ups are used in testing at the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory.  Figure 3 shows
the Hubble mock-up in a neutral buoyancy simulation at the NBL facility.  The advantages of these tests are that the
entire task can be choreographed in pressurized suits with buoyancy removing most of the negative effects of
gravity.  The key to effective neutral buoyancy training is the quality and neutralization of the mock-ups.  The
primary limitations of neutral buoyancy testing are the lower fidelity and lower mass of the hardware mock-ups, and
the drag of the water.  In addition, even though the astronaut suits and much of the hardware are neutrally buoyant,
the astronauts themselves and some of the operational tools are not.
The high-fidelity mock-ups and trainers for Hubble include:
• The High Fidelity Mechanical Simulator (HFMS), a mock-up of the HST Focal Plane Assembly bays for
large axial and radial scientific instruments.
• The Vehicle Electrical System Test (VEST) facility, a mock-up of the electrical support system equipment
sections which contain the smaller orbital replacement units such as the computer, electronics boxes, and
tape recorders.
• The Exterior Simulator Facility (ESF), a mock-up of the forward exterior shell of the telescope for training
for external components and insulation.  Figure 4 shows the third servicing mission EVA crewmembers in
front of the ESF at Goddard.
• The Aft Shroud Door Trainer (ASDT), a mock-up to provide training for door latches, door opening and
closing, and contingency operations after the difficulties on the first servicing mission in December 1993.
This special-purpose trainer proved its usefulness during the third servicing mission.
All of these trainers, built to HST flight drawings, have been very effective in providing training for the servicing
missions.  After returning from a servicing mission, the astronauts have provided feedback that their initial work
with these high-fidelity trainers provided them with the correct images and operations of what they found on orbit.
FIGURE 3.  EVA astronauts and HST Project scuba divers participate in a servicing mission simulation in the
Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory at the Johnson Space Center.
For the next servicing mission scheduled for late 2001, we are building another special-purpose, high-fidelity trainer
for a critical Power Control Unit (PCU) replacement task.  The worksite for this electronic box has very tight access
to a large number of electrical connectors and therefore requires a special trainer.
To complement these facilities, thermal vacuum testing, which can include astronaut suited subjects in a space
thermal and vacuum environment, is used to simulate flight hardware operations under space conditions.  Astronaut
training at JSC also includes computer-generated virtual reality simulations using “digital mock-ups” for
maneuvering large-mass scientific instruments and solar array panels.  Because HST is on orbit, a great portion of
the crew’s training – as well as the auditing of the mock-ups and trainers – results from an extensive library
containing over 65,000 photographs of flight hardware before it was launched, during crew testing and training, and
on orbit during servicing missions.
The high fidelity training facilities are supplemented by the lower fidelity of neutral buoyancy simulations, which
use mock-ups that emphasize the form, fit, and function of those interfaces that are critical to the astronauts’
operations.  The facilities and mock-ups are audited by the EVA and equipment engineers who are the experts for
that equipment.  The experts ensure that all of these features of the underwater test hardware are of a fidelity as close
as possible to the flight hardware.  In all cases, the possibility for negative crew training is minimized.
FIGURE 4.  The EVA crewmembers for the third servicing mission in front of the Exterior Simulator Facility at
Goddard Space Flight Center.
The complementary nature of all of these HST EVA training facilities and methods emphasizes the need for
elements of each phase of the development process to…
…evolve.
Many HST lessons learned are based on the importance of establishing processes that allow natural evolution.
Recognizing that the following evolutions are a normal and beneficial part of the development process has been an
important lesson learned in itself:
• Initial EVA hardware procedures and concepts evolve into mature designs after testing, evaluation, and
feedback from the astronaut crew.
• Frequently, EVA tools that were originally initiated as concepts for nominal tasks evolve into designs for
tools for contingency use.
• Part-task testing in the neutral buoyancy simulations evolves into final end-to-end task choreographies.
• Engineering development of EVA tools and procedures by GSFC evolves into formal astronaut crew
training by JSC and documentation into flight data files.
• Rough timeline estimates by the planners for EVA tasks are refined as they evolve into the final EVA task
times that are expected on orbit.  (As this evolution begins, typically a 20-percent time adjustment factor is
added to compensate for future efficiencies, historical expansion of times on orbit, and improvements that
are achieved through repetition in training.)
In order to reduce risk and to plan for mission success, as each phase of the EVA development process evolves, we
have learned that it is critical to…
…train, train, and retrain.
A lesson learned that has been critical to the success of each Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission has been the
importance of extensive training.  This applies to training for nominal tasks and possible contingencies for both the
ground team and the on-orbit EVA astronaut team.  A basic HST EVA principle is that there must be training for
each item of hardware that is manifested on a Hubble servicing mission.
The neutral buoyancy testing at NBL is the primary method for practicing end-to-end operations.  It starts with part-
task training for a particular task, such as a Rate Sensor Unit (RSU) change-out.  It is supplemented by practicing
with near flight-like RSU mass mock-ups in the High Fidelity Mechanical Simulator at GSFC.  Then it concludes
with formal NBL crew training by JSC for end-to-end operations by both of the EVA crewmembers assigned to
perform the RSU change-out task.
An important part of this lesson learned is that the end-to-end practicing must consider all aspects and details of the
change-out such as:
• Relative positions of the two EVA crewmembers (one on the Remote Manipulator System, the other “free-
floating”).
• The transporting of the old and new RSUs between their stowage locations and HST, and of the tools
required for the task.
• All tethering protocols and transfer operations for the crewmembers, RSUs, and tools.
• The time and motion efficiencies of the RSU change-out and any parallel activities during the task.
The extensive astronaut crew training in NBL simulations follows these proven guidelines:
• Start with 1-g familiarization and training using the mock-ups out of the water and using any special-
purpose trainers.
• Conduct training for contingency as well as nominal tasks, supplemented by briefings and “tabletop” scale
models.
• Include other astronaut crewmembers, such as the IntraVehicular Activity Remote Manipulator System
arm operator.
• Conduct cross-training so that each EVA crewmember can perform any task during the mission.
• Practice enough to achieve at least 10 hours of NBL training for every hour of EVA time planned on orbit.
This 10:1 ratio is the minimum level for Shuttle EVA missions.
Training and practicing continues in mission team simulations with the entire ground-based team on console with
flight nominal and contingency documentation, and often with the EVA astronauts conducting their exercises at the
NBL facility during the simulation.  This provides extensive, realistic practice for nominal and contingency
operations for each planned EVA day.
In parallel with many HST EVA opportunities for training, there are also opportunities to…
…verify flight hardware, interfaces, and procedures.
One reason that historically there have been no problems with components or tools interfacing with HST on orbit is
that there has always been an extensive verification program to fit-check as much hardware as possible.  Because the
real “payload” for HST servicing missions – HST itself – has been on orbit since 1990, some fit-checks naturally are
impossible.  In these cases, the fit-checks are performed with respect to engineering units, flight spares, or high-
fidelity simulators built to flight drawings.
For EVA procedures, neutral buoyancy testing and high fidelity simulator verifications are conducted for:
• Translation paths
• Task sequences
• Stowage locations and task worksites
• EVA astronaut visibility
• Form, fit, and function
For all nominal and contingency tools, it is has been significant that 100-percent verifications are conducted for:
• Tool-to-tool fit-checks for all serial numbers of all nominal and possible back-up tools, such as an
adjustable-extension socket fitting on a wrench.
• Tool-to-equipment fit-checks, such as the tool socket fitting on a Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) latch bolt.
• Equipment-to-equipment fit-checks such as the flight FGS fitting into its flight stowage container on a
payload bay carrier and into the flight-like mock-up of its Aft Shroud position in HST.
For a typical servicing mission, more than 3,500 flight tool fit-checks are conducted, giving confidence that there
should be very little risk of fit problems on orbit.  Figure 5 shows HST second servicing mission EVA astronaut
Steven Smith conducting a fit-check on a scientific instrument while wearing astronaut gloves prior to the mission.
FIGURE 5.  Astronaut Steven Smith performs a flight tool fit-check on an axial instrument while wearing
astronaut gloves.
As new scientific instruments and orbital replacement units are scheduled for installation, fit-checks with nominal
and contingency tools are conducted and recorded.  For example, before the Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object
Spectrometer (NICMOS) scientific instrument was installed during the February 1997 second servicing mission, two
sets of special, large sized sockets were fit-checked with valves on NICMOS because of their potential need on a
future mission.  During the December 1999 third servicing mission, the same sockets were successfully used to open
the valves.
All of the fit-check data is entered into an extensive verification matrix database for formal documentation
(Goddard, 1995).
This and other lessons learned have contributed to Hubble EVA mission success because the HST Project has
continually met its objective to…
…apply lessons learned.
The Hubble Space Telescope EVA development and mission support processes have been successful for three
servicing missions because attention has been paid to identifying – and then applying – lessons learned.  EVA
lessons learned, along with those of other branches of the Hubble Project, are collected on many levels:
• Lessons learned that are applicable internally within the EVA team.
• EVA Team lessons learned with respect to other HST Project teams (Goddard, 1994).
• Project lessons learned applicable to other NASA Centers, such as Johnson Space Center and Kennedy
Space Center.
• NASA lessons learned from other EVA missions (Fullerton, 1994).
SUMMARY
Significant lessons learned have been collected, reviewed, reported, and incorporated wherever process
improvements can be made to the Hubble Space Telescope ExtraVehicular Activity development process.  These
HST EVA lessons learned also have been applied to other projects, such as International Space Station, for flight
tool development and the neutral buoyancy simulation process.  The HST processes serve as models because they
have resulted in 13 successful EVA days during three EVA-intensive Hubble servicing missions, as represented in
Figure 6.
FIGURE 6.  A “free-floating” servicing mission EVA astronaut during a Hubble servicing mission.
In the future, many aspects of these lesson learned will be applicable to large space structure deployment, satellite
servicing (including refueling), satellite retrieval, extravehicular robotics missions (including robotics, telerobotics,
and astronaut-robot “partnerships”), and long-duration spaceflights.
The HST EVA lessons learned that have been identified are in the areas of:
• team building
• requirements definition
• hardware and procedures design
• astronaut crew feedback
• contingency planning
• training methods and facilities
• extensive training
• evolution
• verification
• application of lessons learned.
These lessons learned are currently being applied to the next HST servicing mission planned for late 2001 as the
Hubble EVA development cycle continues.
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